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The Involuntarily Confined Mental Patient and
Informed Consent to Psychiatric Treatment
There are many traumatic experiences awaiting a person about to
be admitted to a mental institution. The new patient faces a totally
different environment in which he will probably lose his identity and
individuality. In addition-and perhaps more importantly-the new
patient suffers a serious loss of many of his personal rights and liber-
ties.1  Furthermore, the mental patient is sadly neglected by the
American public and legal system. He is left to flounder on his own;
he is systematically stripped of his rights, and neither society nor the
legal system can offer a valid justification for the deprivation of these
rights. 2
In 1972 over 750,000 people were admitted to public and private
mental institutions. Over 400,000 of these new patients were placed
in public institutions operated by state and county governments.' Ber-
tram S. Brown, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health,
recently stated that every year approximately two per cent of the popu-
lation receives some sort of psychiatric or mental care. Furthermore,
he predicted that this percentage would continue to grow rapidly.4
In fact, one out of every ten Americans will require hospitalization
1. Scheff lists thirty-one rights lost formally and officially by the mental patient
upon his commitment to a mental institution. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 188-89
(1966) [hereinafter cited as SCHEFF]. In many states, owing to the absence of legal
guidelines and reviewing machinery, hospital officials have unlimited discretion in areas
ranging from correspondence, visitation, and employment to mechanical restraints and
medical treatment. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 171 (S. Brakel and R. Rock ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brakel].
In fact, certain commentators feel that a mental patient loses more rights upon commit-
ment than a defendant sentenced to prison. L. OR.AND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREAT-
MENT 42-43 (1973).
2. One commentator has noted:
Although modern psychiatry has demonstrated that individual mental patients
differ vastly in their capacities for responsibility, mental hospital commitment
in most states automatically strips them en masse of specific civil rights-
sometimes of all such rights regardless of capacity.
Testimony of Albert Duetsch, Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 40 (1961), cited in R. ALLEN, E. FER-
STER, and J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 182 (1968).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (HSM) 73-9005,
PROVISIONAL PATIENT MOVEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA-CITY AND COUNTY
MENTAL HOSPITAL INPATIENT SERVICES 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as INPATiENT SERV-
ICES]; B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY vii (1972).
4. Brown, A National View of Mental Health, 43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 700, 702
(1973).
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for a mental disorder during their lifetime. '  Even though many people
face possible hospitalization, the general public and the individual
mental patient are unaware of the aforementioned loss of rights awaiting
a person about to be committed to a mental institution.0
In the last ten years legal and medical scholars have begun a move-
ment to reform mental institutions and mental health law. 7 There have
been several recent court decisions that have recognized the need for
such a reform.8 For instance, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indi-
ana implicitly gave its approval to this reform movement when it said:
The particular fashion in which the power [of commitment] is exer-
cised . . . reflects different combinations of distinct bases for
commitment sought to be vindicated. . . Considering the num-
ber of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substan-
tive limitations on this power have not been more frequently liti-
gated.9
This note will discuss the reasons and the justifications for the loss
of the mental patient's right to determine whether he wishes to receive
the proposed psychiatric treatment. It will also attempt to determine
whether an involuntarily confined mental patient is capable of consent-
ing to or refusing psychiatric treatment provided by an institution and,
if the patient is capable, whether the patient should be allowed to ex-
ercise this right. The right to refuse or accept treatment offered is
generally described as "informed consent." This concept has been
recognized by the majority of jurisdictions concerning the typical doc-
tor-patient relationship. 10  A mental patient, however, is denied the
right to give his informed consent ,to -treatment once he is committed
to an institution.
This note will deal only with the right of the involuntarily con-
5. Siegel, The Justifications for Medical Commitment-Real or Illusory, 6 W.
FOREST Intra 21 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Siegel].
6. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PsYcHiATRY 223-53 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SZASZ].
7. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971) [hereinafter cited as Krr-riE];
Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 S.
CLARA LAWYER 447 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ferleger]; Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment-Some Comments on Implementation, 10 DuQUES. L. REv. 579 (1972).
8, E.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), modified, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972)(right to treatment); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (prisoner being trans-
ferred from prison to a mental institution must be accorded the same rights as a per-
son who would be civilly committed).
9. 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1971).
10. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972);
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344
Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 113, 119 N.W.2d
627 (1963); Bang v. Carles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958);
Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1967).
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fined" mental patient to give his informed consent to treatment. A
patient who voluntarily enters a state mental hospital does not en-
counter the same problems in regard to release as does an involuntary
patient. The voluntary patient who becomes dissatisfied with his
treatment can leave the institution; in effect, he is exercising his right
to refuse treatment. 12
Over forty per cent of the patients admitted to public hospitals in
1972 were admitted as involuntary patients.' 3 Another ten per cent
were placed in these institutions in such a manner that these patients
could be deemed to be involuntarily confined.' 4  All of these patients
receive treatment whether or not they desire it. Therefore, a large
number of patients in mental hospitals are being denied their right to
give their informed consent to treatment.
The presumption made by the legal system and the institutions is
that when a person is committed to an institution, he can no longer
effectively consent to the psychiatric treatment offered by the hospital.
In order to determine the truth of this presumption, this note will first
examine the commitment standards in relation to the commitment pro-
cess and psychiatric diagnosis. Thereafter, the note will discuss
whether the person committed must accept the treatment offered by
the state even if that person is capable of giving a valid consent, and,
in the alternative, whether the state has a right and/or duty to treat
a mental patient over his objections. The final section will discuss
whether the involuntarily confined patient can meet the criteria neces-
sary for a person to give informed consent.
11. A person is involuntarily confined when he is "judged to be mentally ill" and
he is removed "from his normal surrounding to a hospital authorized to detain him."
Brakel, supra note 1, at 35.
12. However, a voluntary patient can be denied his freedom if the hospital admin-
istrators petition the courts to have him committed as an involuntary patient. See gen-
erally Gilboy and Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 NW. U.L.
REV. 429 (1971); Benton, Criteria In Civil Commitment Proceedings, 26 U. MIAMI
REV. 659, 663-65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Benton]. Twenty-six states allow
for the detention of the voluntary patient if the superintendent thinks it is necessary.
During this period the superintendent must initiate commitment proceedings. Brakel,
supra note 1, at 23. The Illinois statute reads as follows:
Each voluntary admittee shall be allowed to leave the hospital within five
days, . . . after he gives any professional staff member written notice of his
desire to leave . . . unless within said five days a petition and the certificates
of two examining physicians, . . . are filed with the court ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 5-3 (1973). However, only nine states require the hos-
pital staff to advise the voluntary patient of his right to leave the institution at any
time. Brakel, supra note 1, at 23.
13. INPATIENT SERVICES, supra note 3, at Chart-Admissions to State and County
Mental Hospital by Legal Status of Admission, Sex, Race and Age-United States,
1972.
14. Id. Three sub-classes were entitled as follows: Non-protesting, Prison Trans-
fers, and Incompetent For Trial. Patients within these three groups are more clearly
associated with the involuntarily confined patient than with a patient who voluntarily
enters a state hospital.
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COMMITMENT PROCESSES
An examination of commitment standards and statutes is essential
to determine what a court decides when it commits a person to a men-
tal institution. Although almost all states have separate commitment
and incompetency proceedings, very few mental patients actually receive
an incompetency hearing.' 5 Therefore, the loss of one's rights must
flow from the commitment order. If all commitment procedures clearly
determine that a mental patient lacks the ability to give his informed
consent, then only those who really need treatment and whose illness
prevents them from perceiving this need are actually committed.',
But, if the commitment process does not conclusively determine that
an involuntarily confined mental patient lacks the ability to consent,
perhaps people are being committed who need treatment but who are
fully capable of determining if they want this treatment.' 7
It is important, therefore, to determine if the commitment process
distinguishes between mental illness and total incompetency. If it
does not, then many merely "functionally annoying"' 8 people are be-
ing committed to institutions without a determination being made that
they are not capable of consenting to treatment. The mental patients
within this group are not committed because of their inability to func-
tion; rather, they are committed because their erratic behavior makes
other members of society uneasy. 19
The Commitment Statutes
As previously mentioned, a mental patient is deprived of many of
his personal rights upon commitment to a mental hospital. Since the
patient, in most cases, suffers a serious loss of his personal freedom,
it would logically follow that the commitment standards should be very
concise and clear. Furthermore, it would also be logical to conclude
that forced hospitalization would be used by the courts only as a last
15. Brakel, supra note 1, at 250-60.
16. Even those patients who might be totally incapable of giving an informed con-
sent must be protected by a guardian. See text accompanying notes 117 through 118
inf ra.
17. See text accompanying notes 107 through 118 infra.
18. The author feels that many people are committed to mental institutions not be-
cause of their erratic behavior but because their presence makes friends, relatives,
neighbors, and co-workers uneasy. These pople are capable of functioning in society
except for these behavioral quirks. Therefore, these people are "functionally annoy-
ing."
19. Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Nondangerous Mentally Ill:
Substantive Limitations, 18 S. DAK. L. REV. 407 (1973).
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resort. However, recent in-depth studies have indicated the oppo-
site. 20  The statutes are so broad and vague that they do not identify
"with clarity or precision" which mental illnesses require commitment
or the severity of mental illness for which "involuntary hospitalization,
with the accompanying deprivation of many personal and civil rights,
is justified."'" Three states, California, New York, and Illinois, ac-
counted for almost twenty-five per cent of the total patient population
admitted to public mental hospitals in 1972.22 Yet the statutes of
these three states that prescribe the degree of mental illness necessary
for a person to be committed are inordinately vague.23
The majority of state statutes advance three standards under which
a person may be involuntarily committed to a mental institution: the
patient is insane or psychotic; he is either dangerous to himself or
others; or he is sick and needs institutional help.24 While the reason-
ing that supports these standards may be very persuasive, in reality
these standards are very vague and lax.2 5 Commitment statutes are
felt by many authorities to be totally useless because they do not provide
a reasonable basis for determining whether a person should be com-
mitted to a mental institution. One commentator views commitment
standards as unworkable and unreafistic:
It has been demonstrated, for example, that even such standard
tests as being "mentally ill and dangerous to oneself or others"
20. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 128-52; Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1107 (1972); Wexler, Scoville, et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory
and Practice In Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Scoville].
21. Brakel, supra note 1, at 39; Benton, supra note 12, at 662-63.
22. INPATIENT SERVICES, supra note 3, at 5.
23. Each of the state statutes set standards for commitment that are so broad that
they could be subject to almost any interpretation.
"Person In Need of Mental Treatment," . . . means any person afflicted with
mental disorder, . . . if that person, as a result of such mental illness, is rea-
sonably expected at the time the determination is being made or within a rea-
sonable time thereafter to intentionally or unintentionally physically injure
himself or other persons, or is unable to care for himself ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1973).
[Hie may be certified for not more than 14 days of involuntary inten-
sive treatment under the following conditions:
(a) the person is [found], as a result of his mental disorder . . . [to be] a
danger to others, or to himself, or gravely disabled.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5250 (West Supp. 1971).
A "mentally ill person" means any person afflicted with mental disorder to
such extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of others, or of the com-
munity, he requires care and treatment.
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 2.8 (McKinney 1951).
24. SzAsz, supra note 6, at 45-46; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1134, 1138-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Nascent].
25. KITRIE, supra note 7, at 362-69.
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or being "mentally ill in need of care, custody or treatment" are
frequently worthless as concrete or even general guidelines. 26
Some state statutes define the standard for commitment for mental ill-
ness by describing the persons as being "mentally ill." In effect, these
statutes define the terms for commitment by using the terms themselves
in the definition.2 7
Even the reasoning that underlies the purpose of state commitment
statutes is faulty. For example, a large number of statutes call for com-
mitment of a mentally ill person because he is dangerous to himself
or others. Forty-four states have statutes that allow the immediate ap-
prehension and incarceration of a mentally ill person who can then
be held in advance of a hearing because of his condition. Twenty-
seven states have set the standard specifically at "dangerous to self
or others."28  Yet most commentators feel that there is no valid basis
for the generally held belief that mental patients are more violent or
dangerous than other "normal" people. One commentator in attack-
ing this myth stated:
Because of the highly biased reporting, the reader is free to make
the unwarranted inference that murder and rape and other acts
of violence occur more frequently among former mental patients
then among the population at large. Actually it has been demon-
strated that the incident of crimes of violence (or of any crime)
is much lower among former mental patients than in the popula-
tion in general. 29
In 1967 the American Psychiatric Association agreed with the view
held by many commentators that most mental patients are not dan-
gerous. The Association stated that ninety per cent of all mental pa-
tients present no danger to people within the community; and, in most
cases, they are completely harmless."0 Although there are other
groups in society that are far more potentially dangerous than mental
26. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MiNN. L. REv. 289, 293 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Wexler].
27. Brakel, supra note 1, at Table 3.1; Benton, supra note 12, at 662.
28. Roth, Dayley and Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emer-
gency Commitment Statutes, 13 S. CLARA LAWYER 400, 412 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Roth].
29. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 72. Other studies have indicated that the overall rate
of arrest for mental patients with no prior record of arrest was less than JA2 of that
of the general population and they were arrested for less serious crimes. Siegel, supra
note 5, at 35. See also Hastings, Follow-up Results In Psychiatric Illness, 114 AM.
J. PSYCH. 1057 (1959).
30. Council of the American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the
Question of the Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCH. 1458, 1459 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as A.P.A.].
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patients, mental patients are the only persons singled out by society
for preventive detention."
Thus the commitment statutes fail to provide the courts with an ade-
quate basis for determining if a person should be committed to a mental
institution and the reasoning that supports these statutes, in many in-
stances, is inadequate. Yet, despite all these apparent problems, re-
form of the commitment statutes seems to be moving very slowly. In
reality no statutes exist that offer sound and qualitative definitions of
mental illness and forced hospitalization, and none are likely to be
forthcoming in the near future.12
The Court Process
Because of the difficulty involved in interpreting these statutes and
the mass influx of commitment cases in recent years, the courts and
the medical profession have stressed speed and efficiency rather than
taking the time to develop concrete commitment standards.3 3  Fur-
thermore, judges are ill-equipped to deal with the problems that arise
when a psychiatrist determines that a person is mentally ill, and to
deal with the various issues that arise concerning the adequate treat-
ment that is needed for the individual.
In addition, the judges have willfully or by default allowed psychia-
trists to determine whether the person should be committed to a mental
institution.34 The psychiatrists have eagerly accepted this role. Usually
a psychiatrist will first determine what disposition is proper and then will
testify in court in such a manner as to assure that his evaluation is fol-
lowed by the court3 5 even though the final determination concerning
the need for hospitalization is supposed to be left to the trier of fact.
One commentator indicates that in determining whether a defendant
is competent to stand trial, the courts have unequivocally preferred
to leave ,this job to the psychiatrist.3 6 The psychiatrist's opinion, ,there-
31. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. LAW BULL. 101, 104-12
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Ennis].
32. Brakel, supra note 1, at 60.
33. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT, HOSPITALIZATION AND THE DISCHARGE OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 7-20 (R. Rock, M. Jacobson and R. Janapaul, ed. 1968) [herein-
after cited as Rock].
34. Consider id. at 259:
Under these conditions the court becomes essentially ministerial. The judge
has neither the objective legal criteria nor the technical training to decide the
treatment questions really at stake. . . . The court decides the central issue
indirectly through the choice of medical examiners, a matter in which the court
has no special competence and for which it is not responsible to anyone.
35. SZASZ, supra note 6, at 39-78.
36. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE CRIM-
INAL LAW 90-92 (R. Matthews ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Matthews]. Matthews
584
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fore, plays the major role in deciding whether a person should be com-
mitted to a mental institution.37
(a) The Psychiatric Interview
Normally a psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of diagnosis is a
time-consuming process. The psychiatrist must have a number of in-
depth interviews before he can determine if there is a need for any
form of psychiatric treatment.38  Since the courts that forcibly commit
people to mental institutions rely so heavily on the opinion of the psy-
chiatrist, it only seems logical that a psychiatric diagnosis for the pur-
pose of commitment would be made after all sound psychiatric proce-
dures had been followed. Again the opposite is true. Most psychia-
tric interviews to determine if commitment is necessary are so brief
and pointless that they are practically worthless.
The typical psychiatric examination for the purposes of commitment
is conducted without the use of proper psychiatric methodology. Most
court-appointed examiners are sadly lacking in formal training and
many have little background in psychiatry.3 9 One commentator des-
cribed the interviews as hurried, with the questions of the examiners
coming "so rapidly that the examiner often interrupted the patient, or
one examiner often interrupted the other."40  He also noted that the
average interview lasted 10.2 minutes during which little could be ac-
complished by the examining doctor.4 For these reasons an unjusti-
fied amount of reliance is placed by the court on the psychiatrist's find-
ing that a person is mentally ill.
(b) The Hearing
At the actual commitment hearings, the courts almost universally rely
on the opinion presented by the psychiatrist who performed the exami-
nation. One commentator reported in studies of two different Arizona
courts that the judges followed the psychiatrist's opinion in 97.9% and
also notes that court psychiatrists usually make "dispositional diagnoses" of defendants.
The psychiatrist decides what disposition he thinks is necessary and "then conforms
his answers to the legal questions" to accomplish his goal. Id. at 87.
37. Siegel, supra note 5, at 27-29.
38. T. DETRE AND H. JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 69-76 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as DETRE]; F. REDLICH AND D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY 197-219 (1966) [hereinafter cited as REDLICH]. See also Kutner, The
Illusion of Due Process In Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 383 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kutner].
39. Matthews, supra note 36, at 168.
40. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 144.
41. Id. Matthews noted that criminal defendants face the same problems in incom-
petency interviews. The interviews "last only a few minutes" and the reports merely
repeat information "drawn from prior records." Matthews, supra note 36, at 84.
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96.1% of the cases that were observed.4 2  Remarkably, judges fail
to question the psychiatrist as to the adequacy of his examination or
as to -the basis for his decision that a person is mentally ill and in need
of commitment. Yet there are a variety of different factors that will
definitely affect the outcome of the psychiatrist's report, and that will
affect his decision that only commitment will aid the individual in re-
covering from his mental illness.
The following factors, which are important in determining the ade-
quacy of a psychiatrist's report concerning a defendant's competency
to stand trial, are equally applicable to a psychiatric diagnosis that a
person is mentally ill and in need of commitment:
whether the examination is outpatient or inpatient, at a jail,
at the office of a psychiatrist, at a court clinic, at a psychiatric
hospital or the psychiatric wing of a general hospital, at a short-term
institution with a strong therapeutic orientation, or a long-term in-
stitution with a strong custodial orientation; whether the doctor
works in private practice, in a court clinic, or at a state hospital; the
competence, experience, and predisposition of the examiner.43
Despite these important factors, judges continue to accept the opinion
of the psychiatrist without bothering to ask any of these relevant ques-
tions.
The commitment hearing, in most cases, is brief and lacking in for-
mality. Because -the court has such a large caseload, it seems to con-
sider the mere handling of such a large number of cases to be more
important than dealing with the rights of the individual. One com-
mentator reported that in twenty-two hearings observed, the average
hearing lasted 1.6 minutes.44 In Texas the commitment process is
more rapid, and the commitment hearings are often held in the hos-
pital. Patients are present in only ten per cent of the observed cases;
and each hearing on the average lasts only one and one-half minutes.
Most of the attorneys present have never had any contact with their
client until the day of the hearing. 6 The Texas commitment process
is not an exception-it is the rule.46
42. Scoville, supra note 20, at 60. Scheff reported similar results in his study.
SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 139.
43. Matthews, supra note 36, at 81. Detre states that in trying to diagnose neuro-
tic disorders the treating physician must rely on his "clinical experience and individual
preferences and prejudices" to base a decision on such matter as "whether treatment
should be offered and what kind it should be." DETRE, supra note 38, at 231 (empha-
sis added).
44. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 135.
45. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER AND H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL
INCOMPETENCY 50-54 (1968).
46. Scoville's study found that commitment hearings were very brief in Arizona.
Scoville, supra note 20, at 38-51. For similar results in different states see Kutner
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The statutes and the courts, therefore, provide little direction in de-
termining who should be committed to a mental institution. On the
basis of this inadequate system, an involuntarily confined mental patient
can automatically be deemed incapable of consenting to or refusing psy-
chiatric treatment. However, as has been shown, there is nothing
within the statutes or commitment processes that can form a proper
basis for denying the mental patient this right.
The only area left for examination in the commitment process is the
psychiatrist's opinion. It is important to take a brief look at the foun-
dations and formulations that make up a psychiatrist's diagnosis that
a person is mentally ill in order to determine if the psychiatrist does,
in fact, conclude that a patient is incapable of consenting and if the
psychiatrist has a valid basis for making such a decision.
The Psychiatric Diagnosis
A psychiatrist determines if a person is mentally ill and if he should
be committed to an institution on the basis of his understanding of
the term "mental illness."'4 7  To facilitate the psychiatrist's diagnosis,
his profession has established its own definitions and classifications for
mental illness.48 The psychiatrist, therefore, determines if a person
is mentally ill by evaluating the person's conduct in light of the psychia-
trist's understanding of his profession's standards and conceptions of
mental illness. Consequently, the psychiatrist does not evaluate the
person's conduct in light of the legal standards set by state statutes.
Moreover psychiatric classification is made to allow the psychiatrist to
determine what treatment is necessary to cure the patient. But what
do such classifications as schizophrenia49 really tell the courts about
the patient? To determine this factor, this note must examine the
basis for the psychiatrist's diagnosis.
Within the field of psychiatry the use of such systems of classifica-
tions and the use of various terminology cause considerable difficulties
in relation to the actual diagnosis. Different psychiatrists rarely agree
on the diagnosis or evaluation made of the same person. 50 Since there
who studied Illinois; Kutner, supra note 38. For a detailed study of the states of Cal-
ifornia, Florida, Michigan, New York and Washington, D.C., see Matthews, supra note
36.
47. T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 72-74 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SZASZ I].
See KrrrRIE, supra note 7, at 77-79.
48. AMERICAN PsYCHIATRiC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
49. Schizophrenia is a group of disorders manifested by characteristic disturbances
of mood and behavior. DETE, supra note 38, at 108-09.
50. Roth feels that psychiatric diagnosis will depend entirely upon who is watching.
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are no objective standards within psychiatry, individuals "for whom
treatment is desirable but not mandatory" cannot be discerned from
the individuals for whom treatment will not be beneficial. Treatment
results are rarely similar; therefore, the "answer the patient gets depends
upon whom he asks."51  Furthermore, the various categories and
classifications of mental illness established by the American Psychiatric
Association are unavoidably ambiguous. This ambiguity allows the
psychiatrist to place a person into almost any category of mental ill-
ness.
5 2
Psychiatric nosology is also dependent upon society for its guidelines.
Conduct which often determines if a person is mentally ill is defined
by the value society places on the conduct. The less society approves
of the conduct, the more likely the person's conduct will be used to
designate him as being mentally ill.55 The basic determination about
who is mentally ill, in many cases, is thus made by the people in the
general community and not by the psychiatrist, who merely certifies
the opinion of the community.54 As the values of society change, so
do the patterns of psychiatric diagnosis. For instance, in the United
States psychiatrists have been more willing to make a "diagnosis of
schizophrenia" in the last few years.5
All of these factors have led to a movement within psychiatry to re-
examine and re-evaluate the need for psychiatric nosology. Many psy-
chiatrists believe, based on a variety of considerations, that include philo-
sophic, legal, therapeutic, and theoretical ones, that such classifications
of mental illness are "useless at best and downright harmful, mislead-
Much of contemporary psychiatric and psychological theory is not subject to
empirical validation. The basic tenets of psychiatric theory, such as the con-
cept of mental illness itself, are so loosely defined that the same phenomenon
may be perceived differently by individual researchers and the same research-
ers may even describe the same phenomenon differently during different ex-
periments.
Roth, supra note 28, at 403; see also Benton, supra note 12, at 673-75.
51. DETE, supra note 38, at 62.
52. Livermore, Malmquist and P. Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968).
53. Salzman believes that mental illness is defined by our religious and moral val-
ues. Salzman, Changing Styles In Psychiatric Syndromes, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 147, 147
(1973). A diagnosis that a person is mentally ill is also a question "calling for a
policy or philosophical judgment concerning what kinds of abnormality should be in-
cluded" in describing mental illness. Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21
OHiO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1960).
54. Mechanic, Some Factors In Identifying And Defining Mental Illness, 46 MEN-
TAL HYGIENE 66, 68 (1962).
55. E. SLATER AND M. ROT, MAYER-GROSS CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 238 (3d ed.
1969). Scheff reports that there have been over 5,000 studies done on schizophrenia
since 1920, and yet there has been no substantial progress made in understanding this
common mental disorder. In fact, many researchers believe that these reports have
been approaching the problem from the wrong angle. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 7-9.
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ing, and pejorative at worst."5 6
Even though such nosology has caused a great deal of controversy,
the psychiatrist is still required to use this terminology as a basis for
deciding whether a person should be forcibly committed. This deter-
mination, because it will bring about such serious consequences as
forced hospitalization, should be almost errorless to prevent the unnec-
essary incarceration of any individual. Unfortunately for the prospec-
tive patient, the psychiatrist is not always successful in detecting men-
tal illness or the lack of -the same. One commentator reported on a
study that placed eight "sane" persons in mental institutions. All eight
feigned symptoms to gain admission to the institutions, but once 'they
were admitted, they resumed their normal behavior patterns. The
eight freely conversed with the attendants and openly took notes of
their observations. Only the actual patients within the mental institu-
tion knew that the eight volunteers were "normal." Remarkably,
none of the eight had been released as cured by the various institutions
when the study reached its conclusion.5"
The psychiatrist is further hindered in his diagnosis by the role he
plays in the commitment process. In most cases when the psychiatrist
renders his diagnosis, he is either working for the people who wish
to have the patient committed or he is working for the court which
needs his decision to determine if the patient should be committed. 58
Furthermore, 'the commitment process only allows the psychiatrist
to recommend that the person be committed to a mental institution.
The psychiatrist is not asked to determine that a person is incapable
of exercising various rights. Nor is the psychiatrist asked 'to specify
that the person will always be totally incapable of exercising his rights
while he is a patient in the mental hospital. Most state commitment
statutes do not require the psychiatrist to make such a conclusive judg-
ment at the commitment hearing.59 Moreover, the limited time that
the psychiatrist spends with the person renders suspect any determina-
tion by the psychiatrist that the person is incapable of giving his in-
formed consent -to treatment. At the trial, efficiency is the order of
the day; therefore, the psychiatrist does not have a sufficient amount
of time to present any conclusive findings to the court. The patient.,
56. Rosenhan, On Being Sane In Insane Places, 13 S. CLARA LAWYER 379, 380(1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenhan].
57. The average stay within the different mental institutions lasted approximately
nineteen days. Id. at 381-86.
58. SzAsz I, supra note 47, at 56-61, 72-74.
59. Brakel, supra note 1, at 252-56.
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therefore, is sent to a mental institution based on this incomplete diag-
nosis and court process. The institution decides what treatment it
wishes to give to the new mental patient, and then proceeds to treat
the patient without consulting him.60
In summary, the commitment process suffers from the uncertainty
of the psychiatrist's examination. One psychiatrist might recommend
commitment while another might not. The problem is further com-
plicated by the changing values of society which determine what con-
duct denotes mental illness. Furthermore, the psychiatrist is usually
not asked to render his opinion concerning the individual patient's abil-
ity to consent to treatment.6 Due to the gradual breakdown in the
commitment process, a judgment that requires a person to be institu-
tionalized almost always carries with it a denial of rights that by statute
can only be lost at a competency hearing.62  Moreover, the commit-
ment statutes do not provide an adequate basis for determining if a
person should be committed. These factors lead to the inescapable
conclusion that the commitment process offers no satisfactory basis for
determining whether a mental patient is capable of giving his informed
consent to treatment.
The only other basis by which a state can claim that the patient must
accept the treatment offered, even if the patient is capable of deciding
whether he wants the treatment, is the state's commitment power. This
note will now examine the sources of the state power that gives it the
right to forcibly commit and forcibly treat an individual designated as
being "mentally ill."
THE STATE COMMITMENT POWER
As has already been demonstrated, state commitment processes can-
not and do not adequately determine if a committed mental patient
has the ability to give his informed consent to treatment. In spite of
this fact, a person committed to a mental institution is still denied this
60. The treatment of patients in many instances is inadequate, poorly supervised,
and possibly presents a danger to the health of the mental patient.
Patients are routinely drugged as part of their "treatment program." Yet the
fact that a drug produces an alteration in consciousness and a modification
of behavior does not justify its administration as a medicine.
Roth, supra note 28, at 439. Rosenhan reported that the eight pseudo-patients received
a total of nearly 2,100 pills during their stays. The eight received a wide variety of
medications suitable for many different forms of mental illness even though each in-
dividual had been diagnosed as suffering from only one form of mental illness. Rosen-
han, supra note 56, at 395-96. Kittrie feels that the continued use of drugs to alter
behavior patterns raises serious moral questions; he views such treatment as tantamount
to an execution of the personality of the patient. KIrRE, supra note 7, at 388-91.
61. Most states by statute require separate competency hearings to determine if the
patient is capable of exercising certain rights. Brakel, supra note 1, at 255 and Table
8.3.
62. See text accompanying notes 15 through 46 supra.
590
Vol. 5: 578
Informed Consent by the Mentally Ill
right; therefore, the power to deny this right is effective upon the
patient's commitment but it must be derived from sources that are not
within the scope of the commitment hearing. The power to deny this
right to the patient is, most probably, derived from the state's power
to commit an individual to a mental institution.
The most rational view of this power would be that if a state deter-
mines that a person must be committed to a mental institution, the state
must also provide treatment for the mental patient. The failure of the
state to provide adequate treatment-and thereby the failure of the state
to attempt a cure of the patient-would deprive the state of its justifica-
tion for committing an individual in the first place. 6 Therefore, the
state forces treatment on the patient to be able to justify commitment.
To determine if the state has the inherent power to force treatment
on an objecting mental patient, an examination of the theoretical justi-
fications of the state's power to commit people to mental institutions
is needed. The state as sovereign and guardian of its citizens derives
from two sources the power to forcibly commit people who are men-
tally ill. These sources are generally designated as the police power
of the state and the state's power as parens patriae.64  The state, act-
ing through its police power, has the right to detain citizens who pre-
sent a danger to themselves or others. This is an inherent power
within the state because the state owes a duty to its citizens to preserve
order within society. 65 The state as parens patriae has the right to
institutionalize those people whose mental disability makes them un-
able to care for themselves. 66
Police Power
Under its police power the state has a right to commit the danger-
ously mentally ill; but, at the same time, the state owes a duty to its
citizens to commit only those people who the state is absolutely certain
present a danger to society. The state, therefore, can act only when
63. Katz, The Right To Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L.
REV. 755 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz]; Note, The Right of the Mentally Ill During
Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L REv. 494 (1973).
64. KrrrME, supra note 7, at 3-14; Benton, supra note 12, at 678-89; Nascent, supra
note 24, at 1138-39.
65. Marschall, A Critique Of The "Right To Treatment" Approach, cited in TEM
MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 40-41 (G. Morris ed. 1970) [herein-
after cited as Marschall]; Benton, supra note 12, at 678-84; Nascent, supra note 24, at
1141-45.
66. KITrmE, supra note 7, at 8-11, 366-69; SzAsz, supra note 6, at 151-53. The
justification of parens patriae for the commitment of the mentally ill was developed
to deal with the non-dangerous mentally ill individual. Marschall, supra note 65, at
40-41.
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all other reasonable alternatives to forced commitment have failed.67
Furthermore, commitment cannot be justified simply because a person
is claimed to be dangerous; there must also be a strong possibility that
he will commit some violent act. 68 The state must meet these require-
ments because many individual rights and liberties can be lost when
a person is involuntarily confined to a mental institution.
As in the commitment process, the determination that the state
should use its police power to commit a person falls squarely on the
psychiatrist. Few psychiatrists, however, are adept at determining if
a person presents a "danger" to society. In fact, psychiatric prediction
has failed miserably in this area.69 Furthermore, the broad use of
the police power against the mentally ill cannot be justified because
the mentally ill as a group have not been shown to be more dangerous
than any other identifiable group within society.70 Because of these
factors, the police power can only have a limited application in relation
to the commitment of the mentally ill.
The justification for the use of the police power against the mentally
ill is similar -to that offered by the state in incarcerating criminals. Thus,
the rationale for incarceration of criminals is that the state owes a duty
to protect society from those individuals who are dangerous. These
people, therefore, are in prison because they have committed a crime
against the members of society. Despite the fact that a criminal is com-
mitted for the same reasons as a dangerous mental patient, the prison-
er's consent must always be sought by the state when the state wishes
to treat the prisoner for an illness. As in the normal doctor-patient
relationship, the prisoner's consent must meet the informed consent
67. KIr-RIE, supra note 7, at 381.
68. There must be strong proof that the individual is dangerous. He must be
shown to be particularly violent. As for the person possibly injuring other members
of society, "rather rigid criteria of potential violence is needed." Visotsky, Adequacy
Of Treatment And Provisions for Methods of Assuring Adequacy of Treatment, cited
in THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 73-74 (G. Morris ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Visotsky].
69. Katz, supra note 63, at 758-59. This is further proven in cases dealing with
the criminally insane. Psychiatrists in maximum security hospitals are reluctant to re-
lease these people because they are unable to predict with any accuracy that the pa-
tients will never commit violent acts again. Psychiatrists know that when they release
these people from these institutions the courts rely on their evaluation that the person
should be released and they are, therefore, reluctant to certify that a person will never
again commit violent acts. Matthews, supra note 36, at 142; Ennis, supra note 31, at
104-12.
70. Studies have indicated that there are very few reliable criteria which determine
that any individual might present a danger to other members of society. Criminal re-
cidivists constitute one group whose members can be expected, with a high degree of
probability, to commit violent acts against society. And yet, no one suggests that states
use their police power to incarcerate these individuals until they can be shown to no
longer present a danger to society. Marschall, supra note 65, at 57-58. See text ac-
companying notes 28 through 32 supra.
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standards. 7 Furthermore, the police power could not justify the
state's forcible use of medical or psychiatric treatment in an attempt
to rehabilitate a prisoner; the prisoner's consent must always be sought
in such circumstances.7 1
Similarly, a mental patient, who is viewed as presenting a danger
to society, can only be committed to a mental institution as long as
he poses such a threat. This detention by the state is the only justifi-
cation for the use of the police power. As in the case of the criminal,
the mental patient can only lose those rights necessary to maintain his
confinement. The state should not use the police power as a justifica-
tion for forcibly treating the individual mental patient.
Classifying a person as being "dangerously mentally ill" and incar-
cerating him may be reasonable in order to protect society. The need
for such classification and incarceration, however, does not justify the
state's forcible treatment of a mental patient. The ability of the patient
to consent to treatment must not depend on whether the patient is dan-
gerous to society; rather, it must depend on whether he can validly
give his informed consent.
Parens Patriae
The state under the theory of parens patriae acts in its capacity as
sovereign and guardian for various members of society who because
of their mental or physical condition are unable to care for them-
selves.73  The state, therefore, has the duty to care for these people and
the duty to protect their interests. Application of the theory of parens
patriae might allow the state to impose such treatment as is deemed
necessary to cure the mental patient. This imposition would be allow-
able because the patient, due to his mental disability, is unable to recog-
nize his need for such psychiatric treatment. This paternalistic view
has allowed the state to impose very painful psychiatric treatment upon
a mental patient. 74  Such an attitude is best demonstrated by the fol-
lowing statement made in regard to the right of the state to impose
shock therapy on a mental patient.
It must be borne in mind that the care, treatment and mainten-
71. See text accompanying notes 83 through 85 infra.
72. See generally Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used To "Treat?"
"Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616,
667-78 (1972).
73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
555 (1966); State of West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer and Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089(2d Cir. 1971); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 442, 446, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
74. SzAsz, supra note 6, at 169-93; Krrriuz, supra note 7, at 386-98.
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ance of the mental patient is a governmental function and that
the basic considerations in ithis function are best carried out by
the authorized agencies of the Commonwealth, uncontrolled by
the dictates of the patient, his friends, relatives or others.7 5
Therefore, the basic purpose of the state's use of parens patriae is
to impose treatment that will benefit the mental patient. However, the
basic tenets that support this imposition of treatment have never been
shown to be true. The state has no adequate basis for determin-
ing that a mental patient is capable of deciding whether he wants the
offered treatment; the commitment process-the only time when a state
makes any determination concerning a mental patient-never reaches
the issue of the patient's ability to consent.7 6 Without such a factual
justification the state has no basis for relying on parens patriae to im-
pose treatment.
In many cases, psychiatric treatment procedures dispute the state's
position that forced treatment is better then none at all. The best treat-
ment results are usually achieved when the patient willingly accepts the
treatment. 77 Therefore, the patient is benefited the most when he has
the right to accept or reject treatment. This view is closer to
the basic premise of parens patriae -that the state should act for the
benefit of the patient. The state should be willing to allow the patient
this right; and in this way it will be best achieving its goals.
A further danger of the unlimited application of the parens patriae
power is that psychiatrists and mental hospital officials become too pat-
ernalistic in dealing with the individual patient. The patients, in turn,
react to this handling by being "assimilated" into the mental health
system and thereby becoming totally "dependent" upon that system. 8
The whole process is further complicated because the mental institution
becomes totally dependent on the mental patient for a variety of needed
services. Officials become reluctant to release many patients because
these patients perform valuable services at the institution.7 9
This entire process gradually eliminates the remainder of the patient's
75. Position of the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania, quoted in J.
KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION Wri' HUMAN BEINGS 715 (1972).
76. See text accompanying notes 15 through 62 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 128 through 141 infra.
78. Rock, supra note 33, at 225-26. For a further discussion of the possible debil-
itative effects of long-term commitment see text accompanying notes 133 through 136
infra.
79. The institution's staff develops a bias that prevents them from releasing the pa-
tients in many cases. Those patients who can perform tasks that are essential to the
basic operation of the institution are retained the longest. Many large institutions util-
ize patient labor in jobs that range from menial laundry tasks to the performance of
complex tasks in electrical shops. Rock, supra note 33, at 228,
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rights. The more dependent the patient becomes, the less chance there
is of curing him. 0 The less chance there is of curing him, the longer
he stays in the mental hospital. The longer he stays, the more depen-
dent the hospital system becomes on him for his services. The more
dependent the institution becomes on the patient, the less likely it is
that the institution will release the patient. This cycle is produced
and fed by the unlimited application of parens patriae. It starts with
the denial of the right of the patient to refuse treatment and concludes
by effectively depriving the patient of all his rights and his freedom.
The best way to break this cycle is to prevent it from starting. The
state, by initially allowing the patient the right to refuse treatment,
could create an attitude within the patient and an atmosphere within
the mental institution that is very beneficial to the patient's achieving
mental health.8' It follows, therefore, that the state best serves the
interests and needs of the individual mental patient when it allows the
capable patient to give his informed consent to the proposed psychiatric
treatment. This interpretation of the state's role as parens patriae is
quite acceptable if involuntarily confined mental patients are capable
of giving their informed consent.8 2
In summary, the state commitment process and the state commitment
powers fail to provide an adequate basis for determining whether an in-
voluntarily confined mental patient can give his informed consent.
Without such a determination, the state has no foundation for its argu-
ment that it must forcibly treat these patients. Thus, the determination
of whether or not a patient can consent must be made by applying
the informed consent criteria to each individual patient. This note will
now look at the various criteria that make up an informed consent and
will then try to determine which involuntarily confined mental patients
can truly give their consent to the offered psychiatric treatment.
INFORMED CONSENT
In the normal doctor-patient relationship, the physician is required
80. The general rule of thumb is that the longer the patient stays, the worse his
condition becomes.
Nearly all long-term hospital patients exhibit flatness of response, withdrawal,
muteness, and loss of motivation. Once believed to be part of the degenera-
tive process of mental illness, these phenomena are now universally ac-
cepted--even by public hospital administrators-as responses to hospitaliza-
tion itself superimposed on the difficulties of illness.
Chambers, Alternatives To Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1127 (1972).
81. For a discussion of the proper atmosphere to be maintained in a mental insti-
tution see text accompanying notes 137 through 141 infra.
82. See text accompanying notes 107 through 118 infra.
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to obtain the consent of the patient before proceeding with any form
of treatment. If the physician fails to obtain the patient's informed
consent and proceeds to treat the patient, the doctor could be subject
to possible tort liability.8 3 Likewise, when a person seeks private psy-
chiatric treatment, the psychiatrist is required to obtain the patient's
consent before proceeding with the treatment."4 In fact, no cases have
been found that have held that a psychiatrist is not bound by the same
informed consent standards as the regular medical practitioner.8 5
Informed Consent to Psychiatric Treatment and the Courts
The courts in dealing with cases involving a non-institutionalized
patient's informed consent to psychiatric treatment have chosen to ig-
nore the possibility that the patient's mental illness might have pre-
vented him from properly consenting to the proposed treatment. How-
ever, this same factor (the patient's mental illness) is used as a justifi-
cation for not allowing the institutionalized mental patient to give his
informed consent for similar treatment. For example, in Wilson v.
Lehmans6 the patient was suffering from moods of depression that
were manifested in her physical condition. Her physician recommended
that she undergo electro-shock therapy. This treatment involves the
passage of electricity through the temples of the patient's head.
The process is very painful and can cause serious physical injury.'
The patient entered the private hospital and underwent the treatment;
later she sued, claiming that she had never consented to the treatment.
The patient alleged that she could remember nothing about the thera-
py while she was in the hospital. Therefore, she could not possibly
have given her informed consent to the treatment. The court, however,
ruled that her voluntary entrance into the hospital showed that she free-
ly consented to the electro-shock treatment.8 The court did not dis-
83. See cases at note 10 supra. See generally Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed
Consent To Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Waltz]; Fraser
and Chadsey, Informed Consent In Malpractice Cases, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 183 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Fraser].
84. See generally Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DUKE L.J. 696
[hereinafter cited as Dawidoff]; Morse, The Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 19 BAY.
L. REV. 208 (1967).
85. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 599, 606 (1965). However, in 1970, psychiatric malprac-
tice suits made up only 1.5% of the total number of malpractice suits filed in that
year. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-58, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE: THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE Table 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S COMMISSION]. Further-
more, no cases have ever been found concerning malpractice of a psychiatrist in rela-
tion to psychoanalysis. Dawidoff, supra note 84, at 696.
86. 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1964).
87. Redlich, supra note 38, at 337.
88. 379 S.W.2d at 480.
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cuss whether the patient's mental illness could have prevented her from
giving her informed consent to treatment.
In Aiken v. Clary"9 the doctor determined that the patient was a
paranoid schizophrenic and recommended that he undergo insulin
shock therapy. This treatment involves the injection of insulin in suffi-
cient amounts to induce a comatose state; the patient is then revived.
This process is repeated over a period of several days until the psychia-
trist can determine that the patient will be more receptive to psycho-
therapy.90 After the patient initially refused to undergo the treatment,
the physician recommended to the patient's wife that she either convince
him to accept the treatment or that she commence commitment proce-
dures because her husband was seriously mentally ill."
The patient finally agreed to the treatment, and he later sued the
doctor, claiming that the doctor had failed to warn him of all the risks
involved with the treatment. The court reversed and remanded the
case to allow the patient to introduce competent medical testimony to
prove ,that the doctor should have warned him of the risks.92 The
court did not decide if the patient's subsequent consent was valid even
though the patient's own doctor felt that the patient was so ill that he
should be committed to an institution.
Once the patient had been committed, he could have been forced
to accept the very treatment for which the doctor had requested his
consent before the patient was committed. It seems incredible that the
doctor felt the patient could consent to the treatment but, at the same
time, if the patient refused the treatment, he should be committed and
forcibly treated. Therefore, in the doctor's and the court's mind, the
patient's ability to consent was determined, not by the effect the illness
had on the patient's capabilities, but by whether the patient was con-
fined to a mental institution.
It seems remarkable that a person suffering from a mental illness
could be deemed incapable of giving his informed consent to psychiat-
ric treatment solely because of his status as an involuntary mental pa-
tient. There seems to be no logical basis for allowing a private indi-
vidual the right to give his informed consent to psychiatric treatment
while an involuntarily confined mental patient suffering from the same
illness can be denied this right.
89. 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
90. REDLICH, supra note 38, at 336-37.
91. 396 S.W.2d at 671.
92. Id. at 676.
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Proponents of forced psychiatric treatment for mental patients
counter this argument by stating that only those people who are incap-
able of giving their informed consent are forcibly committed and treated
by the states. 3 However, as has already been shown, the present com-
mitment process cannot adequately determine whether a patient is cap-
able of consenting to or refusing the psychiatric treatment.94 At the
same time, the state's theoretical justifications for commitment fail to
provide an adequate basis for allowing the state to forcibly treat the
mental patient.95
Therefore, the person's status as an involuntarily confined patient
cannot be -the factor that determines whether he can consent to the
treatment. As in the two cases just discussed, the courts must look
at the circumstances of the individual case in order to determine
whether the patient can consent. The proper way to do this would
be by applying the informed consent standard to each individual men-
tal patient. Each mental patient must be deemed capable of giving
his informed consent until an application of the informed consent stan-
dards shows that he lacks this capacity.
Informed Consent Criteria and the Mental Patient
The following criteria form the basis of a valid informed consent
to regular medical treatment: ability of the patient to consent; full dis-
closure of all risks by the treating physician and a consent that is freely
given.96 Application of these criteria has led to the following formu-
lation of informed consent. The patient must be able to make an in-
telligent choice from among the various courses of possible treatment
or to refuse treatment altogether.9 7  The doctor must inform the
patient of the following: "(1) the diagnosis, (2) the general nature
of the contemplated procedures, (3) the risks involved, (4) the
prospect of success, (5) the prognosis if the procedure is not performed,
and, (6) alternative methods of procedure, if any."9' 8 Finally, the pa-
tient must be free from any coercive influences when he makes his
decision based upon the doctor's disclosures. 9
Analogously, there must be a standard by which one can determine
93. Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13 U. OF KAN. L. REV.
59, 63 (1964).
94. See text accompanying notes 15 through 62 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 63 through 82 supra.
96. Waltz, supra note 83, at 643-46; Fraser, supra note 83, at 186-87.
97. SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 29.
98. Fraser, supra note 83, at 186.
99. Waltz, supra note 83, at 643-46.
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whether a mental patient can truly give his informed consent to treat-
ment. Such a standard, while containing criteria similar to that needed
to form a general informed consent, must take into consideration the
involuntarily confined mental patient's environment. The standard
should be tailored to meet the patient's abilities and to overcome his
shortcomings. In the past, the American legal system has been willing
to adopt certain rules formulated to deal with the problems presented
by a person's mental disability. For example, several different tests
have been developed to determine whether a mentally ill person is
responsible for his actions.
In criminal law the courts have established tests to determine whether
a person is competent to stand trial100 or whether a person can be
held criminally responsible for his acts, if, at the time of their perfor-
mance, the person was mentally ill.0' As for incompetency to stand
trial, the diagnosis of a mental disorder is not in and of itself sufficient
to warrant a finding of incompetency. The mental disorder must cause
an impairment in judgment regarding the specific issues involved. 102
In contract law a mentally ill person is bound by his contract if he
possessed "sufficient mind or reason to comprehend the nature, terms
and effect of the contract in issue.'1 0 3  A few jurisdictions declare
that a person is incompetent to contract upon his commitment to a
mental institution. Therefore, any contracts made after the commit-
ment proceedings are void. But most states require an independent
finding-through a separate hearing-that the mentally ill person is
incompetent to make a contract.10 4
A testator who is mentally ill can make a will as long as he knows
the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his
100. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has "sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and if
he has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F.
Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1951). See also Matthews, supra note 36, at 10-21. Hess
and Thomas, Incompetency To Stand Trial: Procedures, Results And Problems, 119
AM. J. PsycH. 713 (1963). Brakel, supra note 1, at 410-13.
101. There are several different tests to determine if the defendant was insane at
the time he committed the crime. One of the most prevalent ones is stated as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks adequate capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
102. REDLICH, supra note 38, at 713.
103. Turley v. Turley, 374 Ill. 571, 575, 30 N.E.2d 64, 66 (1940); Harris v. Riv-
ard, 64 Wash. 2d 173, 175, 390 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1964); Page v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co. of America, 12 Wash. 2d 101, 108, 120 P.2d 527, 531 (1941).
104. Brakel, supra note 1, at 304-05.
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bounty; and as long as he is capable of relating these factors together
to make his intended disposition of property.' ° As in the case of
making a contract, some states equate hospitalization of a person with
general incompetency, but most states do not apply this rule. 10 6 These
states require an independent hearing to determine if the person is
competent to make a will.
Therefore, commitment for a mental disability alone does not prevent
a mental patient from validly executing a contract or drawing a will.
The mental patient need only meet the stated criteria for each act.
Thus, if our legal system has established tests for mentally ill people
in regard to certain forms of their conduct, there seems to be no logical
reason why similar standards cannot be developed to allow an involun-
tarily confined mental patient to consent to or to refuse the proposed
treatment.
Ability
A growing number of commentators feel that mentally ill individuals
are perfectly capable of making a rational and understanding decision
with regard to the psychiatric treatment offered by a mental institu-
tion.'0 7 While the patient might not be capable of making these deci-
sions at all times, almost all involuntarily confined mental patients ex-
perience periods of "lucidity" during which they should be allowed to
make these decisions.' 08  As previously mentioned, most commit-
ment proceedings fail to determine if the patient is able to give an
informed consent and, therefore, these capabilities of the patient are
never fully explored at the hearing. If the patient is fully advised,
and he is deemed capable of making rational decisions, there is no
valid reason for not allowing him to make his own decision. In reality,
patients cannot decide whether they want the proposed treatment be-
cause nobody bothers to ask them.
It should suffice to note that the "mental patient" often does not,
in fact, know "what he is letting himself in for." But, in our view,
this is not because he is incompetent or stupid, . . . but because
the psychiatrist does not tell him what he intends to do for him.' 09
105. Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38 (1904); In re Weedman's Estate, 254 Il. 504,
506, 98 N.E. 956, 957 (1912); Gilmer v. Brown, 186 Va. 630, 639, 44 S.E.2d 16,
19 (1947).
106. Brakel, supra note 1, at 305-06.
107. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 471-73; SzAsz, supra note 6, at 149-53; Kaplan,
Civil Commitment "As You Like It," 49 Bos. L. REV. 14, 22 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Kaplan]. See generally KITTRIE, supra note 7; T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL
ILLNESS (1961); Ennis, supra note 31.
108. Siegel, supra note 5, at 31; Rosenhan, supra note 56, at 389-90.
109. Alexander and Szasz, From Contract to Status Via Psychiatry, 13 S. CLARA
LAwYR 537, 552 n.70 (1973).
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Therefore, these commentators feel that if a capable mental patient is
adequately informed of the proposed treatment, he should be allowed
to make a rational choice of whether to accept treatment or to reject
it.
Psychiatrists recognize that many forms of mental illness do not ren-
der a person totally incompetent. The exercising of certain rights, like
consent to treatment, should not depend upon the form of the patient's
illness, but rather, should depend upon the effect the illness has on
the patient's ability to understand the problems connected with his treat-
ment. Therefore, a judgment that a person should be committed must
not include a denial of all rights unless there is a specific finding that
the patient is totally incompetent."' Thus, the view that a mental
patient may be unable to consent to psychiatric treatment because he
is unaware of what is going on around him and the view that the mental
patient is incapable of free choice "may only be an illusion, an illusion
that is without any foundation.""'
Furthermore, since the psychiatrist spends such little time in deter-
mining what the mental patient's capacities are, any judgment by an
examining psychiatrist that a patient is incapable of giving his informed
consent to treatment must automatically be suspect. Unless a psychia-
trist makes an in-depth examination of the patient that allows him to
conclude that the patient is totally incapable of giving his informed con-
sent, it must be concluded that the patient is capable of giving his in-
formed consent to the proposed psychiatric treatment because the psy-
chiatrists has no basis for reaching the opposite conclusion.
The actions of many patients, once they are committed, indicate that
they are fully aware of the environment that surrounds them: an indica-
tion that they are capable of making rational decisions. These mental
patients actively manipulate their environment; they make every effort
to convince the hospital staff that they are responding to treatment and
that they are achieving goals established for them by the hospital. This
phenomenon occurs irrespective of the actual effectiveness of the treat-
ment offered by the mental institution.' 12 The rising number of
voluntary mental patients also indicates an ability on the part of many
mentally ill people to choose between treatment and freedom."' If
110. McGarry and Kaplan, Overview: Current Trends In Mental Health Law, 130
AM. J. PSYCH. 628, 628 (1973).
111. Visotsky, supra note 68, at 72-73.
112. Lipsius, Judgments of Alternatives to Hospitalization, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 892,
892 (1973); see also E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) [hereinafter cited as GOFFMAN].
113. Ennis, supra note 31, at 104.
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a patient is capable of making such choices and coping with his envi-
ronment there is no reason why he cannot be deemed capable of giving
his informed consent to treatment.
Several state statutes also indicate that mental patients, in general,
are fully capable of giving ,their informed consent to medical treat-
ment. 14  These statutes require the institution to seek the consent of
the patient before any regular medical treatment can be administered.
The Illinois statute reads as follows:
Surgery may be performed on patients only if the consent of the
patient, of the parent of a patient nunder 18 years of age, or the
guardian of any patient is first obtained but if an emergency exists
and the life of the patient is threatened, consent need not be ob-
tained .... 115
It would seem anomalous, therefore, that mental patients can be
deemed capable of consenting to regular medical treatment, but incap-
able of consenting to psychiatric treatment. This is especially true be-
cause there are many forms of regular medical treatment that would
require a greater deal of mental capacity on the part of the mental
patient to understand than do certain forms of institutionalized psychia-
tric care. To resolve this and other problems within the Nebraska
Mental Health Code, one commentator has proposed that the mental
patients be allowed to refuse any treatment offered by the mental insti-
tution at any time.11 6
These factors indicate that there is a high degree of probability that
many involuntarily confined mental patients have the ability to consent
to or to refuse any treatment offered by an institution. From the above
passages the following criteria can be derived that can serve as guides
for determining if the mental patient has the ability to consent: the
patient must have the ability to rationally understand the nature of the
treatment, the risks involved and the need for such treatment.
These criteria are similar to the criteria necessary for a general in-
formed consent to medical treatment. However, the only different re-
quirement is that the mental patient need not be able to give his consent
at all times during his hospital stay. As long as the patient has periods
when he is lucid, he should be deemed capable of consenting, and his
consent can only be requested during this period. A consent given
114. Brakel, supra note 1, at Table 5.3.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-8 (1973). The California and New York
statutes allow the patient to refuse certain types of psychiatric treatment. CAL. WELF.
AND INST'NS CODE § 5325 (West Supp. 1971); N.Y. MENTA. HYGIENE LAW § 15.03
(b) (McKinney 1972).
116. Kaplan, supra note 107, at 44,
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at any other time cannot be valid for the simple reason that the patient
gave the consent when he lacked the ability. Furthermore, if a patient
does not have the ability to consent during his stay, then the consent
of his guardian must be sought.
If the informed consent concept is going to be properly applied to
the involuntary mental patient, the psychiatrist and the mental institu-
tion can no longer force treatment on the patient even if the patient
cannot give his consent. In the normal doctor-patient relationship
it is the right of the patient or the patient's guardian, and not the right
of the doctor, to decide whether to pursue a particular course of treat-
ment." 
7
There is no valid reason why ,this guardianship principle cannot be
applied to the involuntarily confined patient's relationship with the
treating psychiatrist. Most states have provisions for the appointment
of guardians for mental patients who are deemed incapable of dealing
with their property."' Therefore, there seems to be no reason why
a guardian cannot be appointed to accept or to refuse treatment on
behalf of the patient if the patient is not capable of giving his informed
consent to the proposed treatment at all times during his stay at the
mental institution.
The guardian should be allowed to seek the independent advice of
a psychiatrist who is not a member of the institution's staff. In this
way the guardian would be able to properly protect the interests of
the incompetent mental patient.
Disclosure of Risks
A patient's consent to medical treatment is not valid unless the phy-
sician has advised the patient of the risks that will accompany the pro-
posed treatment, including all collateral risks that might affect the
patient's decision." 9  Consent that is based upon a full disclosure
of risks is required because of the fundamental belief that every person
has the right to know what is happening or win happen to his body
and a right to participate in any decision affecting it."' °  Therefore,
it is the duty of the treating psychiatrist to disclose to the mental patient
all the risks that are inherent in the proposed treatment.
117. See generally Rock, supra note 33; A. DUETSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 1969); M. GUrrMACHER AND H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCIATRY AND THE
LAW (1952).
118. Brakel, supra note 1, at 250-65.
119. Waltz, supra note 83, at 630.
120. SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, supra note 85, at 74-75. Judge Cardozo's often-
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When this standard is applied to the mental institution setting, two
problems develop. First, the relationship between the doctor and his
patient is sharply contrasted by the relationship between the state-ap-
pointed psychiatrist and the involuntarily confined mental patient.
This latter relationship lacks the fiduciary qualities of the former. 2'
The psychiatrist is primarily the agent of the state and secondarily the
treating doctor of the mental patient.' 22 The psychiatrist, therefore,
is placed in a difficult position because the state, his employer, has
placed the patient in the mental institution because of its decision that
the patient needed treatment. The psychiatrist must avoid the tempo-
tation of not disclosing certain risks to the patient because of the psy-
chiatrist's fear that the patient will refuse the treatment. If the psychia-
trist falls into the temptation of not informing the patient of the risks
involved with the treatment, the patient cannot give a valid consent
to the treatment. Any treatment by the psychiatrist in such cases
could make him liable to the patient for any injuries ,the patient might
suffer from the treatment. 123
In order for the psychiatrist to avoid this pitfall, he must make a
full and free disclosure of the risks involved to the mental patient.
He must advise the mental patient as if the patient were not confined
in an institution, and he must give the patient the same advice as if
he were treating him in his office. The psychiatrist should view the
patient as a private citizen with a right to determine what he wants
to do with his body.
In the normal doctor-patient relationship, the treating physician's
duty to disclose risks does not require the physician to disclose every
conceivable risk, no matter how remote, that is involved with the pro-
posed treatment. The courts, in general, have required the treating
physician to disclose only those reasonable consequences that a reason-
quoted statement succinctly sums up the feeling of the American legal system in re-
gard to this matter:
The right of every individual to determine for himself what is to be done with
his body is a fundamental precept of American jurisprudence.
Sch'oendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
121. In the typical doctor-patient relationship, the patient is a paying customer.
Like any other person who performs services for a fee, the doctor owes certain duties
to his patient. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV.
549, 586 (1959).
122. SZASZ I, supra note 47, at 56. See also J. Shestack, Chairman, American Bar
Association, Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Address Before Seminar Of Prac-
ticing Law Institute On Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 8-9, New York City,
Dec. 8, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Shestack].
123. The psychiatrist could be liable in tort on a theory of either battery or negli-
gence. Dawidoff, supra note 84, at 711-14.
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able medical practitioner would disclose under similar circumstan-
ces. If the procedure is new and unorthodox, the doctor is
required to explain this factor to the patient and to advise the patient
that there are unknown risks involved with the proposed treat-
ment.1
25
The application of this latter part of the disclosure of risk standard
to the mental institution setting raises a second problem for the treating
psychiatrist. The use of several types of psychiatric therapy-drug
therapy, shock therapy and lobotomies-can cause many possibly harm-
ful side effects. In particular, drug therapy, the most prevalent form of
psychiatric treatment, causes many painful side effects and can possibly
cause permanent damage to the physical system.12 6  The possible
side effects vary from patient to patient, and also depend a great deal
upon how often the patient has been treated with the same drug in
the past.127  Therefore, in many cases, the psychiatrist will not be
able to tell in advance exactly what possible risks might face the mental
patient. In order to protect himself, the psychiatrist must disclose those
risks that a reasonable psychiatrist would disclose under similar circum-
stances.
Once it has been determined that the patient has the capacity to give
his informed consent to the proposed psychiatric treatment and that
the patient has been warned of the relevant risks involved with the treat-
ment, then it must be determined if the involuntarily confined mental
patient can freely give his consent to treatment within an institutional-
ized setting.
Consent Freely Given
The involuntarily confined mental patient must be freely able to de-
cide whether he wishes to accept the treatment offered by the institu-
124. Natanson v. Kline, 183 Kan. 393, 403, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960); Woods
v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 21, 27, 377 P.2d 520, 524-525 (1962). But see Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). The Canter-
bury court stated that the test for determining whether a particular risk or peril must
be disclosed is its materiality to the patient's decision. Therefore, all risks potentially
affecting his decision must be disclosed. 464 F.2d at 785-90.
125. Fiorentino v. Wegner, 26 A.D.2d 693, 694, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558-59 (1967).
But see Waltz who argues that a patient can never consent to unknown risks in any
treatment. Waltz, supra note 83, at 632-35.
126. The aforementioned types of therapy have a wide range of side effects that
cannot be covered in depth in this note, An example of possible side effects from
the use of the drug phenothiazene used to treat schizophrenia, will demonstrate the
possible risks involved in the use of drugs to treat mental patients. The drug can cause
minor forms of temporary paralysis, convulsive seizures, abnormal tension and possible
catatonic states. DETRE, supra note 38, at 535-91.
127. For a detailed discussion of the use of drugs in treating mental patients see
DETRE, supra note 38, at 528-634; Wexler, supra note 26, at 298-99.
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tion. This is an essential element of any informed consent. 2 ' When
applying this part of the informed consent concept to the mental
patient, the following problems might arise because of the institution-
alized environment in which the mental patient is placed.
Most forms of psychiatric treatment require that the patient freely
accept the treatment and that the patient be willing to cooperate with
the psychiatrist.129  A cooperative patient will aid the psychiatrist
in treating the patient and will make the patient's recovery much easier.
For these essential reasons the psychiatrist and the mental institution
must make sure that there are no coercive factors operating on the
patient's free will that might negate his consent to treatment.
The first dilemma facing the involuntarily confined mental patient
is presented by the role the psychiatrist plays at the mental institution.
The psychiatrist is both the doctor and the evaluator. As the doctor,
the psychiatrist will directly seek the consent of the mental patient con-
cerning the proposed treatment. As the evaluator, however, the psychia-
trist is the one who determines when the patient is to be released from
the institution.'i 0 The patient, therefore, is faced with 'the complex
problem of withholding his consent for treatment from the very person
who determines when he is to be released and what privileges he will
have during his stay at the mental institution.''
Furthermore, the psychiatrist represents to the mental patient one of
the last memories that the patient has of contact with the outside world.
The new patient may be desirous of holding on to all the remaining
features of his past freedom. He will be quite "susceptible to -the in-
fluence and suggestions" of the psychiatrist.1 2  The burden of over-
coming these factors will fall squarely on the psychiatrist. He must
recognize the problems that face a new mental patient with regard to
the patient's being able to freely give his informed consent. The
treating psychiatrist is obligated to do all he can to ascertain that the
mental patient's consent was voluntarily given before he can proceed
with any treatment.
The very environment of a mental institution can exert coercive in-
fluences on the involuntarily confined mental patient. The individual
patient, in most cases, almost totally losses his identity and his individu-
128. See text accompanying notes 95 through 99 supra.
129. Dawidoff, supra note 84, at 697-98; A.P.A., supra note 30, at 1459.
130. KiTTRIE, supra note 7, at 101; REDLICH, supra note 38, at 200-05; Shestack,
supra note 122, at 8-9.
131. SzAsz, supra note 6, at 169-70; see generally Ferleger, supra note 7.
132. Ferleger, supra note 7, at 451.
Vol. 5: 578
Informed Consent by the Mentally IlI
ality upon his admission to the mental institution. He feels "powerless
and gradually loses his confidence" as he is continually exposed to the
"depersonalization of the mental institution."' 83
One commentator convincingly captures the total feeling of frustra-
tion and hopelessness that may overcome the new mental patient:
[T]he new patient finds himself stripped of many of his ac-
customed affirmations, satisfactions and defenses, .... . Here
one begins to learn about the limited extent to which a conception of
oneself can be sustained when the usual setting of supports for
it are suddenly removed.18 4
Within the mental institution, the mental patient gradually develops a
whole new self-image. As more and more decisions are made for him,
he adopts the image that hospitalized mental patients are "losers, suf-
ferers, and victims."'8 8
The existing institutional, structure totally supports the patient's new
self-image. Patients are expected to follow all orders given to them
without questioning these orders.'8 6 The institution will release the
mental patient only if he shows a willingness to obey the rules. There-
fore, the patient's desire for release could effect his decision concerning
the offered treatment. It is within this setting that a mental patient
would be expected to voluntarily consent to treatment. While this is
indeed a grim picture, it is not totally impossible for a mental patient
to give his consent freely. The institution and the psychiatrist will have
to recognize the right of the patient to refuse treatment. Once they
recognize that the patient does have this right, they will have to make
every possible effort to make sure that the patient freely consents.
One of the primary goals of the earlier-mentioned reform movement
is to enlarge the rights and responsibilities of the individual mental
patient within the mental institution. The more the psychiatrist and
the mental institution are made aware of these rights, the more freedom
the patient will have. In effect, he will be freed from the coercive
elements of the institution, and he will be able to freely consent to treat-
ment.1 7  If the psychiatrist and the institution are reluctant to grant
these rights to the patient, appropriate legal action must be taken to
protect the rights of the patient.
133. Rosenhan, supra note 56, at 394-98.
134. GOFFMAN, supra note 112, at 148.
135. R. Rubenstein and H. Laswell, THE SHARNO OF POWER IN A PsYcHluc Hos-
PrrAL 5 (1966) cited in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WrH HuMAN BEINGS 231 (1972).
136. Visotsky, supra note 68, at 66.
137. Shestack spoke of setting up an "administrative procedure act" that would pre-
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Such action was taken in Wyatt v. Stickney.138  The guardians of
mental patients and the employees of Alabama's Bryce State Hospital
filed a class action suit alleging that the constitutional rights of the
patients were being violated because the sub-standard facilities of
Bryce did not provide adequate treatment for the patients., Judge
Johnson gave the state of Alabama six months to remedy the Bryce
situation.' At the end of the six-month period the state of Alabama
had failed to take the necessary action. Judge Johnson proceeded to
formulate a detailed set of proposals that the Alabama authorities had
to follow to correct the conditions at Bryce.
As part of the guidelines the court adopted a patients' bill of rights
which required that the mental patients in Bryce be free "from ex-
cessive medication;" that the patients not be subject "to experimental
research without their express consent;" and that the mental patients
not be subject to "lobotomy, electro-convulsive treatment, and ad-
versive reinforcement conditioning" without the "express and informed
consent" of the mental patient after he has had time to consult "with
counsel or [the] interested party" of his choice. 4 ° These standards
are a recognition by the Wyatt court that the mental patient in most
instances is fully capable of deciding what he wants to do with his
body. The adoption of these and similar proposals by mental in-
stitutions will allow the involuntarily confined mental patient an oppor-
tunity to freely give his informed consent to treatment.14 '
CONCLUSION
The commitment process, the commitment criteria, the methods of
psychiatric diagnosis and the theoretical justification of ,the state
commitment powers offer the state no reliable basis for determining
that the involuntarily confined mental patient cannot give his informed
consent to psychiatric treatment offered in mental institutions. The de-
termination as to whether a mental patient can give his consent must
be made by applying the relevant informed consent criteria to each indi-
vidual mental patient. Therefore, the psychiatrist and the mental insti-
scribe rules of conduct to be followed in the mental institution. Enforcement of this
act could be by an "ombudsman, an advocacy system, an inspector general, or it could
be some new model still to be developed." The general theme behind such a program
would be the restoration of the mental patient's rights. Shestack, supra note 122, at
13-14.
138. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), modified, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), docketed for appeal, Civil No. 72-2634 (5th Cir., filed Aug. 1, 1972).
139. 325 F. Supp. at 786.
140. 344 F. Supp. at 380.
141. Shestack, supra note 122, at 13-14.
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tution must first determine if the patient can and did consent properly
to the proposed psychiatric treatment. The following criteria can be
used by the institution and the psychiatrist to determine if the mental
patient did give his informed consent to the treatment:
(1) The patient must have periods of lucidity during which he
is capable of rationally understanding the need for the treatment,
the risks involved, and the nature of the proposed treatment;
and'42
(2) the treating psychiatrist must have disclosed to the patient,
when the patient was able to understand, all direct and collateral
risks that a reasonable psychiatrist would disclose under similar
circumstances; and
(3) the patient must have consented when free from any coer-
cive influences.
The re-establishment of the patient's right to consent to or refuse
treatment is part of the process of restoring as many rights to the mental
patient as is possible. 14 3  The psychiatrist and the mental institution
must be made to reorder their priorities in order to establish a more
considered opinion as to what is best for the patient. It is hoped
that the recognition that each individual mental patient might be able
-to give his informed consent will facilitate this re-ordering.
TIMOTHY M. SULLIVAN
142. Of course, if the mental patient is not capable of giving his informed consent,
the approval of the patient's guardian must be sought before the treatment can be ad-
ministered. See text accompanying notes 117 through 118 supra.
143. The state of New York has adopted a legislative scheme that allows mental
patients to retain as many of their rights as possible.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person should be deprived of
any civil right, if in all other respects qualified and eligible, solely by reason
of receipt of services for a mental disability nor shall the receipt of such serv-
ices modify or vary any civil right of such person .
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 15.01 (McKinney 1972).
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